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Note
Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction:
A New Era
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
I. INTRODUCTION
For one hundred years Pennoyer v. Neff' has been recognized
as the cornerstone of American concepts of state court jurisdiction.
2
The Pennoyer territorial power doctrine limiting a state court's in
personam jurisdiction over persons outside its boundaries was aban-
doned in International Shoe Co. v. Washington3 in favor of a mini-
mum contacts test.4 Until Shaffer v. Heitner,5 however, the Pen-
noyer territorial power doctrine giving a state court unquestionable
jurisdiction over persons and property within its borders remained
unchanged. 6 In Shaffer the United States Supreme Court held that
1. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
2. See generally Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction,
1965 SuP. CT. REv. 241; Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process
Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts. From Pen-
noyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 569 (1958); Zammit,
Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded and Unconstitutional?, 49 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 668 (1975); Comment, Jurisdiction In Rein and the
Attachment of Intangibles: Erosion of the Power Theory, 1968 DUKE
L. J. 725.
3. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4. Id. at 316.
5. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
6. Several lower courts, however, had in essence abandoned Pennoyer
in favor of a minimum contacts test. See, e.g., U.S. Industries v.
Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976); Camire v. Scieszka, - N.H. -,
358 A.2d 397 (1976); Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316
P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub nom. Colum-
bia Broadcasting Sys. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958). Many com-
mentators had also questioned the Pennoyer doctrine as applied to
in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction. See, e.g., Carrington, The Mod-
ern Utility of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HAnv. L. REv. 303 (1962);
Hazard, supra note 2; Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?,
37 Tux. L. REv. 657 (1959); Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction
to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121 (1966);
Zammit, supra note 2; Developments in the Law-State-Court Juris-
diction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
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all assertions of state court jurisdiction must meet the due process
standard of International Shoe.7 This holding implicitly overruled
Pennoyer.8 In Shaffer the Supreme Court abandoned the Pennoyer
doctrines of territoriality and state sovereignty, as they apply
within the states' boundaries. Instead of using the Pennoyer doc-
trine to obtain jurisdiction over nonresidents by asserting jurisdic-
tion over their property located within the state's boundaries, the
Court used a minimum contacts test to restrict the state's power
over nonresidents.
9
The Shaffer decision has a broad and hard-hitting impact on
state court jurisdiction. Although the actual effect of the decision
as it applies to in rem and certain quasi in rem cases may be less
than first appearances indicate, 10 the decision seems to make certain
quasi in rem actions obsolete in states with broad long arm stat-
utes." The following note will discuss the substantive due process
implications of Shaffer12 on quasi in rem, in rem, and in personam
jurisdiction.
II. FACTS
Appellee Heitner, a nonresident of Delaware, filed a sharehold-
er's derivative suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery against
ments]; Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction and Quasi In Rem Juris-
diction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MICH. L. REv. 300
(,1970); Comment, supra note 2.
7. 433 U.S. at 212.
8. Id. at 212 n.39. For other interpretations of Shaffer, see Casad, Shaf-
fer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Theory?, 26
KAN. L. REV. 61 (1977), and Comment, Quasi In Rem on the Heels of
Shaffer v. Heitner: If International Shoe Fits . . . , 46 FORDHAM L.
REv. 459 (.1977).
9. The application of the minimum contacts test in Shaffer significantly
differs from the traditional application of the test. In this instance
the test was used to restrict a state's jurisdictional power whereas,
traditionally, minimum contacts have been used to extend the reach
of state court jurisdiction. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945); Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d
960 (1957) appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub noam. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958). But see Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See also Folk & Moyer, Sequestration
in Delaware: A Constitutional Analysis, 73 COLUMB. L. REv. 749, 781-82
& n.191 (1973); Zammit, supra note 2, at 676.
10. See text accompanying notes 122-24 infra.
11. But see Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 46 U.S.L.W. 2194 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 26, 1977). California is generally recognized as having a
broad long arm statute.
12. Although the Delaware courts dealt with procedural due process issues
in Shaffer, see Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976),
the Supreme Court addressed itself only to the substantive due process
issue.
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Greyhound Corporation, Greyhound Lines, Inc., and twenty-eight
present or former officers or directors of one or both corporations.
Greyhound Corporation is a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in Arizona, and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., is a California corporation with its principal place
of business in Arizona.13 All of the individual defendants were
nonresidents of Delaware. Heitner alleged in essence that the indi-
vidual defendants had violated their duties to the corporations.
14
The activities that caused the alleged violations took place in Ore-
gon.
In order to obtain jurisdiction over the individual defendants,
Heitner filed a motion in Delaware for an order of sequestration
of the Delaware property of the individual defendants. 15 The de-
13. 433 U.S. at 189 & n.1.
14. Heitner alleged that the defendants' violations of duties resulted in
the corporations' liability for damages in a private anti-trust suit and
for a large fine in a criminal contempt action. Id. at 190.
15. Id. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1970) provides:
(a) If it appears in any complaint filed in the Court of
Chancery that the defendant or any one or more of the de-
fendants is a nonresident of the State, the Court may make
an order directing such nonresident defendant or defendants
to appear by a day certain to be designated. Such order shall
be served on such nonresident defendant or defendants by
mail or otherwise, if practicable, and shall be published in
such manner as the Court directs, not less than once a week
for 3 consecutive weeks. The Court may compel the ap-
pearance of the defendant by the seizure of all or any part
of his property, which property may be sold under the order
of the Court to pay the demand of the plaintiff, if the de-
fendant does not appear, or otherwise defaults. Any defend-
ant whose property shall have been so seized and who shall
have entered a general appearance in the cause may, upon
notice to the plaintiff, petition the Court for an order releas-
ing such property or any part thereof from the seizure. The
Court shall release such property unless the plaintiff shall
satisfy the Court that because of other circumstances there
is a reasonable possibility that such release may render it
substantially less likely that plaintiff will obtain satisfaction
of any judgment secured. If such petition shall not be granted,
or if no such petition shall be filed, such property shall remain
subject to seizure and may be sold to satisfy any judgment
entered in the cause. The Court may at any time release
such property or any part thereof upon the giving of suffi-
cient security.
(b) The Court may make all necessary rules respecting
the form of process, the manner of issuance and return there-
of, the release of such property from seizure and for the
sale of the property so seized, and may require the plain-
tiff to give approved security to abide any order of the
Court respecting the property.
(c) Any transfer or assignment of the property so seized
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fendants' property sequestered under the order consisted of Grey-
hound stock and options.' 6 The certificates representing the stock
and options were not physically present in Delaware, but under
Delaware law the stock's fictional situs was in the state and this
rendered the stock subject to seizure.'
7
The twenty-one defendants whose property was seized entered
a special appearance for the purpose of moving to quash service of
process and to vacate the sequestration order. These defendants
(appellants), claimed there were insufficient contacts under Inter-
national Shoe to sustain jurisdiction.' s Both the court of chancery
and the Delaware Supreme Court held that the statutory situs of
the stock in Delaware was a sufficient basis for the exertion of quasi
in rem jurisdiction.' 9
after the seizure thereof shall be void and after the sale of
the property is made and confirmed, the purchaser shall be
entitled to and have all the right, title and interest of the de-
fendant in and to the property so seized, and sold and such
sale and confirmation shall transfer to the purchaser all the
right, title and interest of the defendant in and to the property
as fully as if the defendant had transferred the same to the
purchaser in accordance with law.
16. The property was seized by placing "stop transfer" orders on the
books of Greyhound Corporation. 433 U.S. at 192.
17. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 (1953) provides:
For all purposes of title, action, attachment, garnishment
and jurisdiction of all courts held in this State, but not for
the purpose of taxation, the situs of the ownership of the
capital stock of all corporations existing under the laws of
this State, whether organized under this chapter or otherwise,
shall be regarded as in this State.
18. 433 U.S. at 189-93. The appellants also contended that the ex parte
sequestration procedure violated procedural due process guarantees
and that the property seized was not capable of attachment in Dela-
ware. The Supreme Court, however, did not address these issues.
19. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 229 (Del. 1976). The Dela-
ware Supreme Court disposed of the issue with the following lan-
guage:
There are significant constitutional questions at issue here
but we say at once that we do not deem the rule of Inter-
national Shoe to be one of them .... The reason, of course,
is that jurisdiction under § 366 remains . . . quasi in rem
founded on the presence of capital stock here, not on prior
contact by defendants with this forum. Under 8 Del. C. § 1693
the "situs of the ownership of the capital stock of all cor-
porations existing under the laws of this State . .. [is] in this
State", and that provides the initial basis for jurisdiction.
Delaware may constitutionally establish situs of such shares
here .... [I]t has done so and the presence thereof pro-
vides the foundation for § 366 in this case.
We hold that seizure of the Greyhound shares is not invalid
because plaintiff has failed to meet the prior contacts tests
of International Shoe.
Id. at 229.
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III. BACKGROUND
A. Pennoyer v. Neff
To understand the impact of Shaffer on state court jurisdiction
it must be placed in historical perspective. In 1877 Justice Field,
author of the Pennoyer opinion, was looking for a solution to two
problems. First, there was a need for some kind of notice procedure
in order to inform defendants of actions filed against them, and sec-
ond, he believed judicial remedial power of the states should be re-
stricted to matters of local concern.2 0 The notice problem had its
origins in England with the recognition of default judgments. Be-
fore default judgments were recognized, 2 1 the courts would not pro-
ceed without presence of the defendant. 22 The procedures of at-
tachment and garnishment were employed to compel the defendant
to attend court.23 With the advent of default judgments the princi-
ples of justice demanded that the defendant be notified of the pend-
ing action against him, even though his presence was not necessary
for entering a valid judgment.24 The notice problem was especially
acute because process could only lie personally served within the
jurisdiction, and if the defendant could not be personally served,
either the judgment was invalid or the plaintiff was unable to ob-
tain a judgment and was left without a remedy.25 In order to avoid
this dilemma, a degree of qualification of the personal service of no-
tice rule was needed. The nature of these necessary qualifications
remained unclear until Pennoyer.
26
The problem of limiting jurisdiction to matters of local concern
is solved by the concept of territorial jurisdiction. This concept
does not have an English history but instead originated in continen-
tal countriesY In Pennoyer Justice Field adopted this concept by
announcing the following two principles: (1) "every state possesses
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
20. Hazard, supra note 2, at 245.
21. Default judgments were unknown "as recently as 250 years ago." Car-
rington, supra note 6, at 303.
22. The reason for requiring the defendant's presence may have been the
necessity that the defendant be present for trial by ordeal. Id.
23. When default judgments came to be recognized, the procedures of at-
tachment and garnishment were adopted for the purpose of assuring
a successful plaintiff satisfaction of his claim. Id. at 304.
24. Hazard, supra note 2, at 249.
25. Id. at 250.
26. Id. at 250-52.
27. Id. at 258.
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within its territory,' 28 and (2) "no State can exercise direct jurisdic-
tion and authority over persons or property without its territory. '29
The annunciation of these two principles underscored the notice
problem. Under these principles it was clear the state had no
power to go outside its boundaries to serve process. To solve the
notice problem, Pennoyer held that personal notice was needed for
all actions, except that service by publication was effective where
property was in the state and under the court's control.3 0 Seizure
of the property was considered automatic notice to the owner based
on the legal assumption that the property was always in the posses-
sion of the owner.
31
Both facets of the Pennoyer holding revolved around the concept
that state sovereignty is limited by territorial boundaries. This lim-
itation of sovereignty was originally founded on a respect for mu-
tual states' rights. The full faith and credit clause 32 makes this
state issue a constitutional issue since under the clause a state must
only give effect to a judgment entered in a sister state when the
court rendering the judgment had valid jurisdiction.33 The four-
teenth amendment 34 also makes this a constitutional issue by sub-
jecting the validity of state court jurisdiction to direct constitu-
tional question under the guarantee of due process.3
5
The Pennoyer holding had a harsh effect on in personam juris-
diction. Under Pennoyer, if a nonresident could not be personally
served within the state, there could be no in personam jurisdiction
over him. Another aspect of the Pennoyer decision, however, soft-
ened this harshness. If the nonresident had property located within
the state and the property was brought into the court, the nonresi-
28. 95 U.S. at 722.
29. Id. Justice Field's language in Pennoyer is adopted from Justice Story
who is credited with the earliest American rhetoric of exclusive juris-
diction. Justice Story, in turn, adopted his principles from the theories
of a Dutch jurist, Huber. Hazard, supra note 2, at 258-59, 262.
30. 95 U.S. at 726-27.
31. Id. This holding could be interpreted as the subconscious recognition
by the Court that the adjudication of interests in property is in essence
the adjudication of interests of persons. Comment, supra note 2, at
731.
32. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
33. 95 U.S. at 729. See also F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, Civnm PRocEDuRE §
12.13 (2d ed. 1977).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
35. 95 U.S. at 733. For the due process implications of the Pennoyer hold-
ing, see Jonet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1135 (3d Cir.
1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring).
JURISDICTION
dent could be subject to state court jurisdiction 6 through in rem
or quasi in rem jurisdiction.
3 7
B. Harris v. Balk
Twenty-eight years after Pennoyer, Harris v. Balk38 held that
jurisdiction could be obtained over a creditor when a debt owed him
was located within the jurisdiction.39 The debt, an intangible, was
held to be located wherever the debtor was located. 40  Harris ap-
plied the in rem and quasi in rem doctrine of Pennoyer to intangible
and moveable property. Harris made state court jurisdiction over
nonresidents easier to obtain and at the same time created the possi-
bility that nonresidents would be forced to litigate in forums sub-
stantially inconvenient to them because the "situs" of the intangible
property was in a forum, the location of which they could not con-
trol.4 1
C. International Shoe Co. v. Washington
In 1945, International Shoe completely abandoned the Pennoyer
territorial doctrine as it applied to in personam jurisdiction over
persons outside the jurisdiction.42 The court noted that historically
36. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 200. See also Zammit, supra note 2,
at 670. Pennoyer required that the defendant be served notice by pub-
lication. 95 U.S. at 726-27.
37. In rem and quasi in rem actions can be defined as follows: Pure in
rem actions are judgments which only affect the title or status of the
res which is the object of the proceeding. Such judgments are good
against the world. Quasi in rem actions determine all interests of cer-
tain known defendants rather than of all persons who might claim in-
terests in the property. Quasi in rem actions fall into two classes.
Class one quasi in rem actions [hereinafter referred to as quasi in rem
I] have as their principle objective determination of interests in the
specific subject property. Class two quasi in rem actions [hereinafter
referred to as quasi in rem II involve situations in which a plaintiff
has a personal claim against one nonresident defendant and, in order
to get jurisdiction over the nonresident, property owned by him and
located within the jurisdiction is brought into the court by attachment,
garnishment, or the equitable proceeding of sequestration. Either a
trial or default judgment follows and if the plaintiff is successful his
claim against the defendant is satisfied out of the property. Develop-
ments, supra note 6, at 949.
38. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
39. Id. at 222.
40. Id.
41. See text accompanying notes 102-03 infra.
42. The language of International Shoe did not require the holding be
limited to in personam jurisdiction. See Jonet v. Dollar Savings Bank,
530 F.2d 1123, 1132 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring). However,
International Shoe on its facts was an in personam case and until
Shaffer the Supreme Court and most other courts limited the holding
to in personam cases. Cf. Steele v. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339, 347 (5th
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in personam jurisdiction was based on the court's de facto power
over the defendant's person43 and then stated:
But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to per-
sonal service of summons or other form of notice, due process re-
quires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that maintenance of
the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play or substan-
tial justice."
44
The Court also called for an "estimate of inconveniences" on the
part of the defendant subject to trial away from his home state.45
The Court indicated that to correctly measure sufficient minimum
contacts, emphasis should be on the quality and nature of the activ-
ity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of laws.46
Although International Shoe dealt with in personam jurisdiction
and Harris dealt with quasi in rem jurisdiction, both cases in effect
expanded the jurisdictional reach of state courts over nonresidents.
International Shoe set a standard based on the "quality and nature"
of contacts. This standard was subjectively applied in each in per-
sonam case to determine if the minimum standard allowed under
due process had been met. The courts continued a trend of expand-
ing state court jurisdiction until the standard of sufficient minimum
contacts found in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.47 was
very minimum indeed. In McGee the only contacts of the nonresi-
dent defendant with the forum state were an insurance certificate
that the defendant had mailed to the plaintiff in the forum and pre-
mium payments mailed by the plaintiff from the forum and ac-
cepted by the defendant.
48
One year later, the Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla49 drew
the line on expanding state court jurisdiction and held that there
were insufficient contacts for in personam jurisdiction.50 Hanson
Cir. 1973) (International Shoe standard should apply regardless of the
particular type of jurisdiction, but the legal technicality of the type of
jurisdiction bears on the constitutional issue).
43. 326 U.S. at 316.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 317.
46. Id. at 319.
47. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
48. Id. at 223. State courts have found even fewer contacts sufficient to
satisfy the minimum contacts standard. See, e.g., Cornelison v. Cha-
ney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976).
49. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
50. The Court found the trustee in question had no office in the forum and
had transacted no business there. Further, the trust assets were not
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added another element to the minimum contacts test and required
that it was "essential in each case that there be some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conduct-
ing activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws."51
D. In Rem and Quasi In Rem Cases
The abandonment of the Pennoyer doctrine that took place in
in personam cases did not occur in in rem and quasi in rem cases
until Shaffer. Traditional in rem and quasi in rem cases did not
use the same standard of due process that had been applied in in
personam cases.52 Jurisdiction was proper if it was reasonable, and
it was reasonable if the "presence" or "situs" of the property was
within the jurisdiction. 53 Locating moveable or intangible property
caused considerable problems under this test and involved the fic-
tional process of assigning a "situs" to the property.
5 4
In 1950, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.5" indi-
cated that the Pennoyer doctrine of territoriality as it applied to in
rem and quasi in rem actions was beginning to erode.5 6 Mullane
held that constructive service was not sufficient to guarantee due
process regardless of the fact that the action could have been
held or administered in the forum and there had been no solicitation
of business there in person or by mail. The only relation between the
trust agreement, which the trustee was administering, and the forum
was the fact that it was the most recent domicile of the settlor. Id.
at 251-52. See also Kurland, supra note 2, at 622.
51. 357 U.S. at 253.
52. "The Fourteenth Amendment did not, in guaranteeing due process of
law, abridge the jurisdiction which a State possessed over property
within its borders, regardless of the residence or presence of the owner.
That jurisdiction extends alike to tangible and intangible property."
Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917). Cf. Steele
v. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339, 347 (5th Cir. 1973) (International Shoe
standard should apply regardless of the particular type of jurisdiction,
but the legal technicality of the type of jurisdiction bears on the con-
stitutional issue). See also Owenby v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 111 (1921).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 56 (1971); R. WEiN-
TRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 140 (1971). See also
Folk & Moyer, supra note 9, at 779. In some instances, however, a
state would not exercise jurisdiction when it was against public policy.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNELICT OF LAws § 60, Comments c, d
(1971).
54. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 33, § 12.3; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56, Comment a (1971).
55. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
56. Shaffer noted this. 433 U.S. at 206. See also Hazard, supra note 2,
at 277.
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classified as an in rem action. The power to use constructive ser-
vice did not depend on how the court classified the action.57
"[T] he requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution do not depend upon a classification for which the
standards are so elusive and confused generally and which, being
primarily for state courts to define, may and do vary from state to
state."58 Mullane suggested that the Court was beginning to realize
that due process standards should be the same for jurisdictional
matters whether the case involves in personam, in rem, or quasi in
rem jurisdiction.
In Hanson, the most recent major opinion on the subject by the
Supreme Court prior to Shaffer, the Court seemed to retreat from
its forward progress. The opinion clearly illustrated the Court's be-
lief that in personam and in rem classifications were still viable59
and the "presence" or "situs" test was still the appropriate due proc-
ess standard for in rem jurisdiction.60
IV. THE SHAFFER DECISION
Traditionally the factual situation presented in Shaffer would be
categorized as a quasi in rem action based on an intangible. 61 The
language of the opinion, however, is much broader and deals with
in rem as well as classes I and II of quasi in rem jurisdiction. 62
57. 339 U.S. at 313.
58. Id. at 312.
59. See notes 49-51 and accompanyifng text supra (discussion of Hanson's
effect on in personam jurisdiction).
60. The text of the IHanson opinion was clearly split into in rem and in
personam issues. 357 U.S. at 246, 250. The in rem discussion dealt
with the situs test while the in personam discussion dealt with mini-
mum contacts.
Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 i.2d 960 (1957), ap-
peal dismissed and cert. denied sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.
v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958), was decided shortly before Hanson.
The decision was evidence of the willingness of Justice Traynor and
the California Supreme Court to-use a minimum contacts test rather
than the situs test to determine whether an intangible was present in
the jurisdiction for the purposes of quasi in rem jurisdiction. The de-
cision was a distorted application of the International Shoe test since
minimum contacts were used to fix the location of the property rather
than to decide the basic issue of jurisdiction. See also Simpson v.
Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 321, 234 N.E.2d 669, 678, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633,
646 (1967) (Burke, J., dissenting) (discusses use of minimum contacts
to determine if a situs is fair and just). Nevertheless the Atkinson de-
cision was clearly a move toward recognition that the same due proc-
ess test must be applied to all cases regardless of the class of jurisdic-
tion. See Traynor, supra note 6, at 663.
61. See notes 79-80 and accompanying text infra.
62. See note 37 supra.
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The Court first noted that the lower decisions in the Delaware
courts were founded on the traditional "situs" test for quasi in rem
jurisdiction.63 The Court gave three basic reasons in support of its
action which held that all assertions of state court jurisdiction must
be evaluated with the International Shoe standard.64 First, juris-
diction over property is in essence jurisdiction over the interests of
persons in the property.0 5 Consequently, it is only logical that the
same due process standard be used in both instances to determine
if the exercise of jurisdiction is proper.6 6 Second, the International
Shoe standard will often times be met in in rem and quasi in rem
167 actions by virtue of the fact that the claims to the property itself
are the source of the underlying controversy.68 Third, the three ar-
guments for maintaining quasi in rem 1169 actions are easily refuted.
The primary rationale behind quasi in rem II jurisdiction is that a
wrongdoer should not be able to escape his obligations by removing
his assets to a jurisdiction where he is not subject to in personam
jurisdiction. This rationale is not sound, however, because it does
not explain why quasi in rem II jurisdiction is recognized even
though the wrongdoer is not trying to escape and has not removed
his assets. It also does not support jurisdiction to decide the merits
of the claim. Finally, the rationale's assumption that a debtor can
escape payment on his obligations by removing his assets would not
seem to be valid under the full faith and credit clause that makes
valid in personam judgments enforceable in all states."h A second
argument for quasi in rem II jurisdiction is that it provides more
63. 433 U.S. at 196.
64. Id. at 212.
65. Id. at 207. This principle lies at the root of the impossible dichotomy
of Pennoyer. Zammit, supra note 2, at 670. See also Hazard, supra
note 2, at 268.
66. 433 U.S. at 207.
67. For a definition of quasi in rem I, see note 37 supra.
68. 433 U.S. at 207. For further analysis, see notes 122-24 and accom-
companying text infra.
69. For a definition of quasi in rem II, see note 37 supra.
70. 433 U.S. at 210. The Court also said at most this rationale "suggests
that a State in which property is located should have jurisdiction to
attach that property, by use of proper procedures, as security for a
judgment being sought in a forum where the litigation can be main-
tained consistently with International Shoe." Id. (footnote omitted).
Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 46 U.S.L.W. 2194, 2195 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 26, 1977), held that this language creates an exception to the
Shaffer rule. This interpretation is subject to question. The Court in
Shaffer at this point in the opinion was stating the rationale behind
quasi in rem II jurisdiction. The Court recognized that one aspect of
the rationale made sense but that does not necessarily mean that in
that situation the general holding of Shaffer will not apply.
534 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 2 (1978)
certainty than the International Shoe test on the question of juris-
diction. The sacrifice of "fair play and substantial justice," how-
ever, for the purpose of simplifying jurisdictional questions must
not be allowed.71 The third argument for quasi in rem II jurisdic-
tion is its long history. Due -process can be offended as easily by
ancient practices as by modern ones, however, and the mere fact
of history adds nothing to the constitutional argument.72
After adopting the International Shoe standard for all assertions
of state court jurisdiction, the Court in Shaffer went on to hold that
Delaware did not have sufficient contacts to meet that due process
standard. This conclusion was based on several factors: (1) the
cause of action was not related to the property; 73 (2) there was not
a sufficient interest of the forum in the litigation;74 (3) the share-
holder failed to demonstrate that Delaware was a fair forum;75
(4) there was no availment by the directors and officers of the
privilege of conducting activities in the state as required by Han-
son;70 and (5) there was no contact between the directors and
officers and the forum.77
Justice Brennan, in his concurring and dissenting opinion,
agreed that the International Shoe standard should apply to all as-
sertions of jurisdiction. He disagreed, however, with the majority's
application of the test in Shaffer and found the evidence in the
case supported a sufficient standard of minimum contacts. "[A] s a
general rule a state forum has jurisdiction to adjudicate a share-
holder derivative action centering on the conduct and policies of the
directors and officers of a corporation chartered by that state."78
71. 433 U.S. at 211.
72. Id. at 211-12.
73. Id. at 213. This will always be the case in quasi in rem II jurisdiction
by definition. In this case Heitner's action was not based on the di-
rectors' and officers' ownership of stock.
74. Id. at 214-15. The majority found there was no compelling state in-
terest in the management of Delaware corporations by the fact that the
Delaware statutes did not base jurisdiction on status as a corporate
fiduciary but instead based jurisdiction on the presence of property.
Justice Brennan disagreed and stated this statutory failure did not
affect the existence of minimum contacts. Id. at 226-27 (Brennan, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
75. 433 U.S. at 215.
76. Id. at 216. The majority found the acceptance of the corporate fidu-
ciary positions was not sufficient under Hanson. Justice Brennan
disagreed. Id. at 227-28 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
77. "Appellants have simply had nothing to do with the State of Delaware.
Moreover, appellants had no reason to expect to be hauled before a
Delaware court." Id. at 216.
78. Id. at 222 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). Cf. Jonet v. Dol-
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V. ANALYSIS
A. Quasi In Rem II Jurisdiction without a Limited Appearance
On its facts, Shaffer involved quasi in rem II jurisdiction under
the Delaware sequestration statute.79 The statute's main purpose
is to compel nonresidents to appear in Delaware courts and be
subject to in personam jurisdiction.8 0 Delaware's failure to provide
for a limited appearance, an appearance in which the defendant can
raise defenses on the merits of the litigation and only be subject
to liability equal to the value of property attached, makes this goal
attainable. In this type of quasi in rem II case, Shaffer clearly held
that the minimum contacts standard must be met in order to satisfy
due process."' The minimum contacts due process standard is now
the same for in personam and. quasi in rem II jurisdiction. Ex-
posure to liability is also the same in both in personam and quasi
in rem II jurisdiction without a limited appearance. Consequently,
in states with broad long arm statutes, under which in personam
jurisdiction is only limited by the due process standard, there will
no longer be a need or use- for this type of quasi in rem II jurisdic-
tion. States with narrow long arm statutes, on the other hand, may
still need to resort to quasi in rem II jurisdiction. In a situation
in which there are sufficient- contacts for in personam jurisdiction
but in personam jurisdiction is not allowed under the state's stat-
utes, the plaintiff willbe forced to look for property owned by the
defendant and located within the state in order to assert jurisdiction
over the nonresident through in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction.
8 2
Nebraska's long arm statute 3 limits jurisdiction over a person
to causes of action that arise from activities in the state. This seem-
ingly narrow statute has been interpreted very broadly by the Ne-
lar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1139 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., con-
curring) (issue of maintaining the situs of corporate intangibles in the
home state of the corporation because of the state's interest in the cor-
poration).
79. See note 15 supra.
80. Folk & Moyer, supra note 9, at 750. The Court noted that this type
of case was the clearest illustration of the argument for applying the
same standard of due process to all types of jurisdiction. 433 U.S.
209 & n.33.
81. The Court did not decide whether the mere presence of property
would be a sufficient basis of jurisdiction where no other forum is
available to the plaintiff. Id. at 211 n.37.
82. Justice Traynor of the California 'Supreme Court has explained that
this was the situation in Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316
P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub nom. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958). Traynor, supra
note 6, at 662.
83. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-536 (Reissue 1975).
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braska Supreme Court in Stuckey v. Stuckey.8 4 In Stuckey the
court held that if the assertion of jurisdiction met the minimum
contacts standard of International Shoe then the jurisdiction would
be allowed under the Nebraska long arm statute.8 5 To the extent
that Nebraska's long arm statute continues to be interpreted broad-
ly in all jurisdictional situations, Nebraska's long arm statute and
lack of authorization for limited appearances suggest that under
Shaffer quasi in rem II jurisdiction will no longer be of use in Ne-
braska.
However, in California, a state generally recognized as having
a broad long arm statute,8 6 a federal court recently held that a type
of quasi in rem jurisdiction tested by a different standard of con-
tacts than in personam jurisdiction still exists after Shaffer. In
Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex 7 the court found an ac-
knowledgment in the Shaffer decision of a distinction between ju-
risdiction for a judgment on the merits and jurisdiction to attach
property as security for a judgment in another forum.88 The Ura-
nex facts encompassed the latter situation and the court held that
although contacts between the defendant and the forum would not
support in personam jurisdiction there nevertheless was a constitu-
tional exercise of quasi in rem II jurisdiction where the jurisdic-
tion was limited, the property's presence in the state was not fortui-
tous, the forum was convenient, and the defendant had no other as-
sets in the United States.89 Although it is questionable whether the
language of Shaffer seized upon by the Uranex court was meant
to create an exception to the Shaffer holding,90 the Uranex decision
seems equitable because jurisdiction was limited to attaching the
property as security for a judgment being sought in another forum
and California was the only jurisdiction in the United States in
which the defendant had property.
B. Quasi In Rem II Jurisdiction with a Limited Appearance
Lower courts and commentators have for some time called for
an end to quasi in rem II jurisdiction because its fictional nature
84. 186 Neb. 636, 185 N.W.2d 656 (1971).
85. Id. at 642, 185 N.W.2d at 660. The court found support for its holding
in both § 25-536 and § 25-539 of the Nebraska statutes.
86. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) provides: "A court of this
state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the
Constitution of this state or of the United States."
87. 46 U.S.L.W. 2194 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 1977).
88. Id. at 2195.
89. Id. In a sense Uranex could be considered a case of jurisdiction by
necessity for satisfaction of the judgment.
90. See note 70 supra.
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permits jurisdiction over many nonresidents over whom the Inter-
national Shoe standard of due process would not allow jurisdic-
tion. 91 Despite these criticisms there have been arguments made
in favor of retaining this type of jurisdiction.9 2 One such argument
is that quasi in rem jurisdiction provides a proper rationale for lim-
ited jurisdiction where in personam jurisdiction would not be justi-
fied.93 This argument speaks of limited jurisdiction in the sense of
limited liability and consequently the argument would only apply
in jurisdictions in which limited appearances are allowed. The
argument proceeds on the ground that when property is per-
manently located within the jurisdiction, or in the case of in-
tangibles when the debtor is domiciled in the forum, then quasi in
rem jurisdiction is reasonable as a form of limited jurisdiction.
94
In states with broad long arm statutes and no limited appear-
ances, quasi in rem II jurisdiction under Shaffer may be all but
useless. The language of Shaffer is sufficiently broad to warrant
the applicability of the minimum contacts standard of International
Shoe even though a limited appearance is allowed.9 5 Whether a dif-
ferent quality and nature of contacts would satisfy the standard
where a limited appearance is allowed is an arguable proposition.9
Regardless of whether the same quality and nature of contacts
would be required, quasi in rem II jurisdiction with a limited ap-
pearance and in personam jurisdiction will remain separate and dis-
91. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 205-06.
92. See text accompanying notes 70-72 supra (three arguments listed by
the Shaffer Court).
93. See Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy
of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. Rnv. 600, 614 (1977).
94. Id. at 621, 624. Uranex, in effect, upheld quasi in rem I jurisdiction
on the basis that the debt and debtor, a California corporation, were
permanently located in the forum. However, Uranex spoke of limited
jurisdiction as limited to the extent of the decision on the merits of the
claim, not as limited liability. 46 U.S.L.W. 2194 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26,
1977).
95. 433 U.S. at 207 n.23, 209 n.32.
96. See Folk & Moyer, supra note 9, at 779. Podolsky v. Devinney, 281
F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), held the attachment procedure authorized
by Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966),
without a limited appearance was unconstitutional as a denial of due
process. This suggests that where the amount of the judgment is lim-
ited, the due process criteria change. See also Munichiello v. Rosen-
berg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), rehearing in banc, 410 F.2d 117
(1969). Also, Uranex, although dealing with limited issues rather
than limited liability, found a lesser standard of contact was needed
in that situation for a constitutional exercise of jurisdiction. 46
U.S.L.W. 2194 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 1977).
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tinct because the degree of liability will be different under each.
The need to resort to quasi in rem II jurisdiction will depend,
however, on the breadth of the jurisdiction's long arm statute.
97
The effect of Shaffer on Seider v. Roth,98 a limited appearance,
quasi in rem II case, is unclear. Seider originally arose as a quasi
in rem action questioning the attachability of an insurance com-
pany's obligation to its insured client.99 Subsequently Seider was
considered as judicially creating a direct action statute against in-
surance companies doing business in the forum. The insurance
companies' insured clients were merely considered conduits to j uris-
diction.100 If Seider is viewed as a true quasi in rem action then
the International Shoe standard must now be met for all "Seider-
type" assertions of jurisdiction. Quite clearly in instances in which
the defendant-insured has had no contact with the forum the stan-
dard would not be met. If, on the other hand, Seider is viewed as
a judicially created direct action statute, the presence of the de-
fendant-insurance company doing business in the forum would
seem to remain a sufficient basis of jurisdiction under International
Shoe.10
C. Tangible Property
The stock sequestered in Shaffer is characterized as an intangi-
ble form of property.'0 2  Intangibles pose a special problem for in
rem jurisdiction because of their ability to be physically located
anywhere and the possibility of multiple liability when state courts
fail to recognize a uniform situs of the property. 0 3 Shaffer may
97. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
98. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
99. Id. at 112, 216 N.E.2d at 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101-02. See Simpson v.
Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 308, 234 N.E.2d 669, 670, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633,
635 (1967).
100. Munichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 115 (2d Cir. 1968), rehearing
in banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1969).
101. Savchuk v. Rush, - Minn. -, 245 N.W.2d 624 (1976), remanded, 97
S. Ct. 2964 (1977), recently upheld jurisdiction obtained under a Min-
nesota statute similar to the Seider procedure. This decision has been
remanded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in the light of
Shaffer.
102. The interest attached is the shareholder's property interest or owner-
ship interest in the corporation. This interest could have its situs any-
where. Two probable locations, however, are the place where the stock
certificates are present or the place of the domicile of the corporation.
See Developments, supra note 6, at 952, 955-56.
103. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961);
F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 33, § 12.15.
JURISDICTION
have presented the most urgent case for changing the due process
standard to the International Shoe standard. Cases such as Shaffer
and Harris, which involved an intangible debt, present the most ob-
vious instances of jurisdiction that appear unfair. When intangi-
bles are involved, the process of assigning a situs to the property
is pure fiction and often the defendant has no idea or expectation
of being subject to suit in the forum of the situs.
Although the majority opinion in Shaffer gave no indication that
the International Shoe test would be any different for tangible
property, Mr. Justice Powell indicated that, in his opinion the ques-
tion remains open, as to whether forms of property with a perma-
nent and indisputable situs would provide sufficient contacts by
their presence alone. 104 Mr. Justice Stevens in his concurring opin-
ion agreed that the majority opinion should not be read to invali-
date in rem actions where real estate is involved.10 5 Justice Pow-
ell's characterization of property, which is indisputably and perma-
nently located, meant more than real property. This is clear as the
next sentence of his opinion singles out real property in particu-
lar.106 All tangible property would seem to have an indisputable
location, but not all tangibles will be permanently located in one
jurisdiction. Exactly what forms of property fit into Justice Pow-
ell's characterization seems to be a fertile area for litigation.
The concept of property with a permanent location or, in other
words, property with a domicile can be analogized to the domicile
of a person. For in personam jurisdiction the domicile of the person
traditionally has been a sufficient basis in and of itself for a consti-
tutional exercise of jurisdiction.10 7 Likewise, the domicile of the
property should in and of itself be a sufficient basis for jurisdic-
tion. 0 8
D. The Transient Rule
The domicile of a person as a sufficient basis of jurisdiction can
be easily justified under the International Shoe standard because of
the state's interest, the defendant's use of the state's benefits, the
quality and nature of contacts, and the fairness of the forum. An-
other traditional basis of in personam jurisdiction, however, is im-
possible to justify under International Shoe. In personam jurisdic-
104. 433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, T., concurring).
105. Id. at 219.
106. Id. at 217.
107. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
108. See Smit, supra note 93, at 616, 621, 624; text accompanying note 94
supra.
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tion based on the mere presence, whether permanent or temporary,
of a person within the jurisdiction was a development of the Pen-
noyer holding that personal service within the jurisdiction'0 9 was
required for a valid exercise of jurisdiction. Only when Pennoyer
required service of notice for in personam jurisdiction did such serv-
ice also become sufficient for in personam jurisdiction. 110 This rule
of jurisdiction, commonly known as the transient rule, is based on
the Pennoyer notion that "[t] he foundation of jurisdiction is physi-
cal power."' 1 Until Shaffer there had been no curtailment of the
state's jurisdictional power over persons or property located within
its boundaries. Shaffer broke that power by holding that all asser-
tions of state court jurisdiction must comply with the International
Shoe standard. It is clear that neither in personam nor in rem ju-
risdiction can, by the mere fleeting presence of the person or prop-
erty within the jurisdiction in and of itself, meet the minimum con-
tacts standard." 2 Consequently, Shaffer has laid to rest the tran-
sient rule of in personam jurisdiction.
E. In Personam Jurisdiction
A further implication of Shaffer for in personam jurisdiction is
its reemphasis of the necessary considerations involved in determin-
ing the sufficiency of minimum contacts. The last major Supreme
Court case dealing with in personam jurisdiction and the minimum
contacts standard was Hanson v. Denckla. 3 Hanson emphasized
the International Shoe factors" 4 and added the requirement that
there must be a purposeful availment by the defendant of the privi-
lege of conducting activities within the state. 1 5 In Shaffer the
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 (1971).
110. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power"
Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L. J. 289, 292 (1956).
111. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
112. In rem and quasi in rem I jurisdiction may, however, by the transient
presence of property along with the other probable factors involved in
those cases, noted by Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207-08, satisfy the Interna-
tional Shoe standard.
113. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
114. These factors include the nature and quality of defendant's contacts
with the forum and whether the cause of action arose from an act done
or transaction in the forum. 357 U.S. at 251, 252.
115. Id. at 253. There has been some disagreement among courts on
whether the Hanson requirement is necessary in all cases or whether
it is a balancing element in cases in which the cause of action does not
arise out of the defendant's acts in the forum. See Comment, Long-
Arm Jurisdiction and Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction and the Fundamental
Test of Fairness, supra note 6, at 308.
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Court applied the same basic test used in Hanson,"6 including the
Hanson element of purposeful availment of the privileges of the
state. 17 Although the Court's application of the test seemed logic-
ally weak when it failed to find a state interest in the management
of a Delaware corporation" s and failed to find a sufficient purpose-
ful availment of the privilege of conducting activities within the
state when the defendants became directors and officers of a Dela-
ware corporation, n1 9 the general test criteria remained identical to
those used nineteen years earlier in Hanson. Whether Shaffer's
failure to find sufficient minimum contacts, where quite clearly
there was some state interest in the proceedings and some availment
of Delaware privileges by the defendants, will reprimand and re-
mind state courts to look for a sufficient due process standard of
contacts and not just any contact 120 remains to be seen.1
2 '
F. In Rem and Quasi In Rem I Jurisdiction
Under Shaffer in rem jurisdiction and quasi in rem I jurisdic-
tion will, like all other assertions of state court jurisdiction, be re-
quired to meet the International Shoe standard. The Shaffer opin-
ion suggests, however, that in these types of cases, where the claims
to the property itself are the underlying controversy, the presence
of the property itself may meet the International Shoe standard by
providing contacts between the forum, the defendant, and the liti-
gation. 22 In these cases the Court pointed out the following usual
circumstances: (1) by definition, the cause of action arises from the
property, (2) there is an availment of the benefits of the State,12 3
and (3) the state has a strong interest in the marketable title of
the property and in settling disputes concerning the property. 24 By
116. See text accompanying notes 73-77 supra.
117. The use of the Hanson criteria did not clear up the confusion: about
when it is to be applied, see note 115 supra, because in Shaffer as in
Hanson, the cause of action did not arise from the property or contact
with the forum.
118. See note 74 supra. Cf. Jonet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123,
1139 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring) (weakness of a state's in-
terest in the situs of its corporations' intangibles).
119. See note 76 supra.
120. There is also a distinction between "minimum" contacts and the "best"
contacts. 433 U.S. at 228 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
121. Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352
(1976), illustrates a recent state court finding of minimum contacts
where the quality and nature of the contacts were suspiciously low.
122. 433 U.S. at 207.
123. The Court noted that this will not be a circumstance in all cases. Id.
at 208 n.25.
124. Id. at 208.
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pointing out these factors the Court clearly did not say that by defi-
nition in rem and quasi in rem I jurisdiction will provide sufficient
contacts. Rather, each assertion of jurisdiction must be individu-
ally tested under International Shoe. The Court merely indicated
the standard may be relatively easy to meet in the usual situation.
The standard will not be met in all situations. Where jurisdiction
is obtained over a defendant by virtue of the defendant's property
in the jurisdiction and the property was placed in the jurisdiction
without the consent of the owner, the factors enumerated by the
Court will not be found.
25
VI. CONCLUSION
Shaffer clearly marks the beginning of a new era in state court
jurisdiction just as International Shoe began a new era some thirty-
two years ago. Shaffer's true significance may be even more revo-
lutionary than International Shoe because it is much easier to ex-
pand state power as International Shoe did than to take away pow-
ers historically exercised by the state as Shaffer does. The new era
of International Shoe can be explained by the mobility of citizens
and the need for personal service beyond a state's territorial bound-
aries.126 The new era of Shaffer, and the transition from the "pres-
ence of property" test to the "minimum contacts" test, can only be
explained as the recognition by the Court of the need for "fair"
treatment of defendants and the specific curtailment of a state's
sovereign powers within its borders. The revolutionary nature of
Shaffer explains the century that passed between Pennoyer and
this monumental decision.
Sharon Raun Kresha '78
125. Id. r25.
126. See Hazard, supra note 2, at 272.
